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Pb l d O b jt i Dt Rl t Problem and Objectives Data  Results
Ex-ante impact analyses of trade policy dominate the economic 
trade literature, and show the still high potential gains from 
agricultural trade liberalization (CBO, 2005). 
Less understood are the factors that affect trade reform and 
negotiation outcomes.













U.S. Partner U.S. Partner
Chile 1.8% 25.0% 23 12 11 10
Quantitative Approach
Data Issues
Unexpected limitations on data availability and accessibility
• Constrained ability to perform detailed sectoral analysis
• More resources are needed to gather the relevant data
Literature review
International Negotiation Theory (INT) suggests that political 
economy institutional framework and negotiation strategies
The objective of this study is to explain the outcome on agricultural 
tariff reform in regional negotiations, with a special emphasis on  
treatment of sensitive products .
Costa Rica 1.1% 46.0% 25 20 9 14
Dom. Rep. 0.9% 58.0% 25 20 5 22
El Salvador 0.3% 32.6% 25 20 9 15
Guatemala 1.0% 39.5% 25 20 5 12
Honduras 0.6% 49.9% 25 20 6 11
Nicaragua 0.3% 34.5% 25 20 8 14
Colombia 1.5% 36.4% 22 19 8 19
Peru 0.5% 17.0% 19 17 4 12
• More resources  are needed to gather the relevant data 
• Inaccessibility of negotiators resulted in incomplete datasets to 
define bargaining strategies
Methodological limitation with regard to the identification of 
bargaining strategies by commodity 
TdA i d TdA i d lf lf
Qualitative Approach
economy, institutional framework, and negotiation strategies 
influence bargaining outcomes. (Putnam, 1988, Odell, 2000) 
Endogenous tariff theory (ETT) focuses on the influence that 
political economy and institutional setting have on sectoral
protection. (Rodrik, 1994; Gawande, 2003)
Conceptual Framework: Testing INT
∆MA  ∆MA : change in openness or market access, defined as the tariff 
reduction negotiated as part of an agreement
Estimation/transformation issues:
Back-loaded nature of reduction schemes (e.g. Figure 1)
Dependent Variable
0.5% 17.0%
*. Trade sharei = (bilateral exportsi,j+ bilateral importsi,j)/(total exportsi + total importsi) Trade Agreement negotiated outcomes  Trade Agreement negotiated outcomes are  are a result of: a result of:
Import pressures which increase lobbying efforts Import pressures which increase lobbying efforts
• • Unemployment  Unemployment pressures/job opportunities pressures/job opportunities
• • Industry  Industry concentration in terms of lobbying efforts concentration in terms of lobbying efforts
Offensive/defensive bargaining strategies  Offensive/defensive bargaining strategies used by negotiators used by negotiators
• • Based on what negotiators know about  Based on what negotiators know about their side/the  their side/the other side other side
• • Based on Based on sectoral sectoral lobbying from both sides in both countries lobbying from both sides in both countries
Limitations 
(1) ∆MA=f(PA,NC|NP) ∆MA=f(PA,NC|NP)
(2) IMP=f(CA,  IMP=f(CA, ∆MA ∆MA)                                             )                                            
Where: Where:
∆MA: negotiated change in market access ∆MA: negotiated change in market access
PA: political economy variables (economic size; concentration ratio; PA: political economy variables (economic size; concentration ratio;
The quantitative assessment ignores the outcome on non-tariff 
barriers such as sanitary phytosanitary and technical barriers to
Quantitative: Simultaneous Equation Model
• Take the final outcome and ignore temporal protection
• Consider the accumulated protection granted during the 
implementation period
• Consider the discounted value of the protection extended during 
the implementation period
Presence of TRQs
• Consider the status of the TRQ to estimate market access
Sf f f Q
• • Based on  Based on sectoral sectoral lobbying from both sides in both countries lobbying from both sides in both countries
• • Knowledge from each side of the others position Knowledge from each side of the others position
The relative power or perceived superior position of each  The relative power or perceived superior position of each side side
References
PA: political economy variables (economic size; concentration ratio;  PA: political economy variables (economic size; concentration ratio; 
import penetration ratio; K/L ratio;  import penetration ratio; K/L ratio; sectoral sectoral/total labor ratio; input  /total labor ratio; input 
sales, other  sales, other sectoral sectoral characteristics) characteristics)
NC: negotiation context variables (GDP ratios; unemployment  NC: negotiation context variables (GDP ratios; unemployment 
rates, balance of payments, other national characteristics) rates, balance of payments, other national characteristics)
CA: comparative advantage variables (relative costs and prices) CA: comparative advantage variables (relative costs and prices)
NP: negotiation process variables (offensive/defensive strategies) NP: negotiation process variables (offensive/defensive strategies)
barriers such as sanitary, phytosanitary, and technical barriers to 
trade, to which countries have turned to grant protection given the 
constraints in the use of tariff barriers imposed by the international 
trading system.
Perfect case comparisons are impossible to determine as no two 
cases are similar in the exact same context.
• Selection of reference period to judge the status of the TRQ
• Aggregation across tariff lines for multi-product TRQs
Presence of non-ad valorem (NAV) tariffs




Figure 1. Back-loaded nature of negotiated outcomes for sensitive agricultural products
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Qualitative  Qualitative methods  methods strengthen quantitative  strengthen quantitative analysis as  analysis as they allow  they allow 
the researcher to identify subtle nuances not captured by the  the researcher to identify subtle nuances not captured by the 
quantitative analysis (Odell 2001 quantitative analysis (Odell 2001). ).
• • Determine  Determine how negotiation outcomes in the Western  how negotiation outcomes in the Western 
Hemisphere FTAs Hemisphere FTAs are similar and how they differ are similar and how they differ
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Hemisphere FTAs  Hemisphere FTAs are similar and how they differ are similar and how they differ
• • Pair FTA  cases that are similar in all but the INT variables of  Pair FTA  cases that are similar in all but the INT variables of 
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